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Introduction
The world economic crisis during 1929?1933 seriously damaged the Japanese economy, and prompt-
ed the Japanese capitalists to adopt a more aggressive policy toward their neighboring countries in 
Asia. Japan?s first target was mainland China. In 1931, Japan began its invasion into the northeastern 
part of China. In the following years, Japan escalated the war in the Chinese continent. It occupied 
Beijing in July 1937, Nanjing in December 1938, Guangzhou in October 1938, Hainan Island in Febru-
ary 1939, and the Paracel Islands in March 1939.
Shortly thereafter, Japan deployed its military to North Vietnam in September 1940. President Hồ 
Chí Minh later confirmed that: ?The truth is that from the autumn of 1940, our country was a colony 
of Japan, rather than a French colony? (Hồ Chí Minh Complete Works 2000: 3).
This paper does not go into the details of the invasion process and the political control by Japanese 
fascists, but rather focuses on the agricultural policy of the Japanese government toward Vietnam and 
its implications for the Vietnamese society during World War II.
1. Confiscatory policy of rice, corn and cereals
On September 22, 1940, Japanese troops entered Vietnam to occupy it and-thoroughly implement 
the policy of ?using war to feed war, to despoil extremely human and material resources of our people 
on all socio-economic activities? (Culture and Information Service, Center for Social Sciences and Hu-
manities in Hồ Chí Minh City 2001: 357). Accordingly, on September 25, 1940, in order to satisfy 
Japanese demands to feed their troops, the French colonialists had to transport rice immediately from 
Hanoi to Lạng Sơn. Thereafter, the French had to sign documents one by one in order to provide rice 
and other necessary materials to the Japanese troops.
On January 20, 1941, the French signed an agreement to provide Japan with 700,000 tons of white 
rice, which was transported from Saigon (Dương Trung Quốc 2000: 325). Also in January 1941, the 
Japanese requested Governor General Decoux to sign an agreement on the exportation of 100 tons of 
rice from Saigon to Japan and the transportation of a million tons of rice for the Japanese military in 
one year, including the amount of rice to provide for ten thousand Japanese troops stationed in Indo-
china? (Nguyễn Phan Quang 1998: 178).
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From 1941 onwards, Cochinchina became a strategic base for the Japanese to conquer Southeast 
Asia. In order to support the conquest, they forced the French colonialists to provide food to feed the 
Japanese troops in Indochina and at the same time export to Japan. A portion of the rice was also used 
to produce alcohol, so as to oﬀset the fuel shortage in Japan.
?The most important resource that Japan expected from Indochina was rice. The import of rice from 
Indochina occupied 25.9? out of the total rice import of Japan in 1940, 25.2? in 1941, 37? in 1942, 
and 56.3? in 1943. [?]. Indochinese rice was also distributed to the Japanese troops deployed in vari-
ous parts of Southeast Asia where there was a shortage of food? (Văn Tạo, Furuta Motoo 2011: 117).
On May 6, 1941, Japan and France signed an economic treaty, aimed at strengthening the coopera-
tion between the colonial government and Japan. This treaty gave Japan many important benefits in 
Indochina, especially in the field of supplying rice. Thanks to this treaty, Japan could distribute food 
rations among the people and soldiers in Japan who suﬀered from bad harvest. In the following years, 
the Japanese government forced the French colonialists in Indochina to sign a new treaty to submit 
huge volumes of rice to Japan.
For Tonkin starting from 1942, the French?Japanese government thoroughly implemented its 
scheme to collect rice for exporting to Japan and at the same time serving the growing local needs of 
the French?Japanese army. Besides the organizations which were established under the Decree dated 
on December 30, 1941, the French?Japanese government also established monopoly organizations that 
took control over the collecting, transporting and processing of rice, and contemporaries called this 
company, federation or ?comptoir du riz [rice factory].?1
On July 18, 1942, Japan forced France to sign another French?Japanese Treaty. Based on this treaty, 
Indochina had to produce; or rather had to transport to Japan 1,050,000 tons of rice and broken rice 
before October 31 and 45,000 tons of rice flour before December 31, 1942 (Dương Trung Quốc 2000: 
355).
The above data shows that, rice from Indochina in general and Vietnam in particular occupied a 
very important role in the invasion policy and territorial expansion of Japan. Not only did Vietnam?s 
rice supply the army but also provided for the daily food requirements in Japan. However, this was a 
large quantity of rice compared with what Indochina produced normally and in particular Vietnam at 
the time.
Here is a table that lists the quantity of rice produced in Indochina, mainly the ones Vietnam sold to 
Mitsui Bussan Kaiska Company in Japan in the years 1940?1945:
1 Under the provisions of the colonial government, only a small number of dealers were entitled to participate in the federation.
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We can compare this to the quantity of rice which was imported from Asian countries to Japan in 
the years 1940?1945 in order to see more clearly the role of Indochina in general and Vietnam in par-
ticular in the ?Strategy for food supply? of Japan.
In terms of rice allocation, Vietnam?s rice production was concentrated in the South, so it was im-
perative that rice could be transported to other areas, namely through the railway. One point should be 
considered however: from late 1942 onwards, the North?South railroad was requisitioned by the Japa-
nese army to transport troops and weapons to the battlefields in the South and back again to help re-
turn wounded soldiers and wealth to the country. This railroad should have been used to transport rice 
from the rice-rich South to the rice-deficit areas of the country. Further exacerbating the situation, Al-
lied aircraft frequently flew along the railroads, bombing or bombarding bridges and trains, disrupting 
the transportation of rice from the South to the Centẻr and North. Likewise, coal could not be trans-
ported from the North to the South to run the factories. To solve the problem of securing coal, the 
capitalist owners used ?burning rice rather than coal? to run the machines. Another problem was also 
found in Annam and Tonkin where the narrow coastal regions could not produce enough rice every 
Table 1.?The quantity of rice that Vietnam sold to Mitsui Bussan Kaiska Company (1940?1945)
Year The quantity of rice as requested (Unit: tons) The quantity of rice exported (Unit: tons)
1940 Unknown 408,000 tons
1941 700,000 tons 585,000 tons
1942 1,074.000 tons 973,000 tons
1943 1,125.000 tons 1,023.471 tons
1944 900,000 tons 498,525 tons
1945 Unknown 44,807 tons2
2 Extracted from the Culture and Information Service, Center for Social Sciences and Humanities in Hồ Chí Minh City 2001: 
359.
Table 2.?The situation of rice imports of Japan from Asian countries (Unit: tons, ?)
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Taiwan 385,000
(22.7?)
272,000
(12.2?)
262,000
(10?)
207,000
(18.2?)
150,000
(19.2?)
9,000
(6?)
North Korea 60,000
(3.5?)
520,000
(23.3?)
840,000
(32?)
72,000
(6.3?)
560,000
(71.5?)
142,000
(94?)
Indochina 439,000
(25.9?)
563,000
(25.2?)
973,000
(37?)
662,000
(58.3?)
38,000
(4.9?)
?
Myanmar 421,000
(24.9?)
438,000
(19.6?)
47,000
(1.8?)
18,000
(1.6?)
? ?
Thailand 284,000
(16.8?)
435,000
(19.5?)
508,000
(19.3?)
177,000
(15.6?)
36,000
(4.6?)
?
Other countries 105,000
(6.2?)
5,000
(0.2?)
? ? ? ?
Figures in Table 2 clearly show that Indochina was the largest rice exporter to Japan throughout the war period (Phan Ngọc Liên 
2003: 276).
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year to support its large population. Thus to augment the supply, it needed help from the South, but 
because rice could not be transported from here, the shortages were even more serious.
Along with rice, corn was also an important food source that was requisitioned by the Japanese fas-
cists and forced to be exported to Japan. The quantity of corn exported from Vietnam was as follows: 
In 1941, the exported amount was 124,923 tons; in 1942, 98,700 tons was exported (accounting for 
46? of total corn production in Vietnam); in 1944, 18,263 tons (45%) was exported and in 1945, 
12,134 tons (9%) was exported (Culture and Information Service, Center for Social Sciences and Hu-
manities in Hồ Chí Minh City 2001: 360).
Besides rice and corn, Japan also requisitioned cereals, although most people in Vietnam still ate 
corn, potatoes, and beans as their main staple.
In the years 1940?1945, Indochina exported to Japan the following quantity of cereals: In 1940, 
149,000 tons was exported (accounting for 55.4? of total cereal imports to Japan); in 1941, 
135,000 tons (50.6?); in 1942, 125,000 tons (15.2?); in 1943, 634,000 tons (84.5?) and in 1944, 
335,000 tons (70.0?) (Culture and Information Service, Center for Social Sciences and Humanities in 
Hồ Chí Minh City 2001: 379).
Being in a position that depended on the protection from Japanese troops, the French government 
in Vietnam at the time had established many agencies dedicated to mining, trading, transportation, 
and provisions of the purchasing prices of rice, corn and cereals to satisfy the increasing demand of the 
Japanese fascists. Those were the ?Interdisciplinary Committee of Rice,? ?Advisory Committee on Rice 
Cultivation,? ?Advisory Committee on the Transportation of Cereals,? etc. and in particular the ?Feder-
ation of Rice? and the ?Federation of Rice and Corn.? At the same time, the French colonialists 
launched a series of policies and measures that were extremely harsh. These involved the requisition-
ing of rice and corn from the population and ended up squeezing the farmers out of their crops.
From the above data, it can be seen that Indochina in general and Vietnam in particular was a major 
supplier of food to Japan in the years 1940?1945. This clearly reveals that the purpose of Japan when 
they invaded Indochina, was not as the Japanese government argued it to be which was ?to cut supply 
lines to Chiang Kai-shek through Indochina? (Culture and Information Service, Center for Social Sci-
ences and Humanities in Hồ Chí Minh City 2001: 380). Rather, it confirmed existing suspicions that 
the Japanese government took over Vietnam and Indochina with the main intention to implement the 
?Strategy for food supply? so as to meet the demands of war. This ultimately resulted in the economic 
plunder of the region.
2. Policy of the forced planting of jute, castor and peanuts instead of rice and other staple 
crops
One of the activities of the Japanese army in the years 1940?1945 that resulted in heavy and endur-
ing consequences for Vietnamese people was ?to force the Vietnamese people to remove rice and 
farm-produced crops to plant jute, castor, etc. in order to make the material to manufacture bags to 
?     ?243
Japanese Agricultural Policy toward Vietnam during World War II
hold rice and oil which were lacking in the war? (Trần Huy Liệu, Nguyễn Lương Bích, Nguyễn Khắc 
Đạm 1957: 82).
According to Minami Yoshizawa in ?Asian War in Our Subconscious,? the reason why the Japanese 
army forced the Vietnamese people to plant jute was because ?jute bags in Indochina were previously 
provided by India, but now they were not imported from India anymore, so the development of the 
jute industry here was an urgent problem that needed to be addressed.
?Jute bags which were used to transport materials in the ?East Asian Commonwealth? were becoming 
practical problems. Therefore, our country (Japan) needed more supplies from Indochina in order to 
reach its/her quota of 30 thousand tons of jute. Indochina, at that time, had an output of 500 tons. We 
(the Japanese) needed to put up 30 thousand tons in the 5-year plan. Meanwhile in Taiwan, production 
of jute was 12 thousand tons. We also had plans to increase production to 30 thousand tons in the 
5-year plan. Thus, it was understandable that there was great hope for Indochina.
Therefore, the expectations for the current Indochina authorities came to meet minimum requests 
and must organize a special mining company (called Indochina Jute Company). This was a joint stock 
company held by representatives of influential people in society, who were given legal status by the 
Government of Japan. It had monopoly power in the production of jute, including encouraging culti-
vation, purchasing, processing, import and export of jute material and providing distribution within 
Indochina under the management of the Government? (Văn Tạo, Furuta Motoo 2011: 610?611).
Concerning the organization of the forced planting of jute, the Dainan Koshi was responsible for 
jute planting in Bắc Ninh Province. 10 Japanese companies had an exclusive right to plant jute in other 
provinces for purchasing. The agency assigned to monitor the forced planting and purchasing of jute 
from these companies was the Economic Commission of the Japanese Embassy in Hanoi. It was re-
sponsible for supplying cash to pay each farmer, and at the same time issue notices and directives. 
However, the money paid to the farmers was not something they could expect to redeem at its full val-
ue because as the war approached its end, the value of Indochinese silver progressively decreased. To 
maintain the military and Japanese rule, the Japanese army stationed in Indochina pressured the 
French government to force Indochina banks to issue more banknotes, which escalated the value of 
materials, and caused serious inflation.
The situation of the farmers being forced to remove rice and farm-produced crops to sow jute is de-
scribed and assessed in the Vietnam Independence newspaper (Việt Nam Độc lập).3 ?In Bắc Ninh Prov-
ince, more than 300 Acreage of potatoes were forced to be destroyed by the Japanese to sow jute.? 
When the farming season came, the jute was not yet ready to be cut. This placed the farmers in a di-
lemma. By keeping the jute, the farmers would have to give up on the rice season, but if they cut it 
down to plant rice, the farmers could be imprisoned by the Western and Japanese authorities and be 
3 Vietnam Independence League is the propaganda agency of the Việt Minh Front. Its first issue was published on August 1, 
1941 in Cao Bắng Province.
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levied with a fine that amounted to the price of 300 Acreage of jute? (Việt Nam Độc lập, 11 October 
1942). At the same time, ?in Thái Bình province, people did not have enough rice so they had to aban-
don jute to plant rice. The Western authorities forced farmers to remove the rice and sow jute again. 
Anyone who did not follow orders would be arrested? (Việt Nam Độc lập, 11 August 1942). With re-
gards to the contents of this issue, Indochinese Communist Party?s General Secretary?Trường Chinh 
said: ?Since the Japanese occupied us, our compatriots were not surprised at their robbery trick like 
growing jute instead of rice (in Northern Vietnam) or growing nuts instead of cotton (in Northern and 
Central Vietnam)? In short, the Japanese army was still loyal to the policy of so-called ?feeding war 
by war? and the Pacific War of the Japanese was clearly a large-scale robbery? (Ngọn Cờ Giải Phóng: 
189). The Acreage and yields of jute in Vietnam increased without pause from 1941 to 1944.
On January 22, 1945, the French protectorate of Cochinchina sent a classified memorandum to the 
leaders of Cần Thơ, Châu Đốc, Long Xuyên, and Sa Đéc Provinces, stating that: ?the Diplomatic mis-
sion of Japan requires the General Government of Indochina to allow Menka KK and Mitsui Bussan 
Kaisha to get contractors for jute cultivation in Southern Indochina. For Southern Vietnam, the 
Japanese required that 1.400 ha of jute cultivation be assigned to the following companies:
?Tokyo Menka KK: 700 ha in Châu Đốc.
? Mitsui Bussan Kaisha: 300 ha in Xuyên; 300 ha in Sa Đéc; 100 ha in Cần Thơ? (Nguyễn Phản 
Quang 1998: 199).
Besides decreasing the land set aside for growing rice and staple crops to make room for growing 
jute, Japanese fascists also forced the Vietnamese farmers to grow castor. Acreages and yields of castor 
in Indochina (mostly in Việt Nam) from 1940 to 1944 are listed in the table below:
The table above shows that the total Acreage of land for growing jute and castor in place of rice and 
staple crops were rapidly growing during the war.
Table 3.?The Acreage and yield of jute in Vietnam (from 1941 to 1944)
Year 1941 1942 1943 1944
Tonkin Acreage 893 ha 300 ha 14,200 ha 12,900 ha
Yield 970 tons 2,400 tons 6,950 tons 6,300 tons
Annam Acreage ? 200 ha 422 ha 670 ha
Yield ? 150 tons 250 tons 100 tons
Cochinchina Acreage ? 200 ha 617 ha 3,332 ha
Yield ? 150 tons 380 tons 950 tons
Source: Annuaire statistique de l?union française: F77
Table 4.?Acreage and yield of castor in Indochina (mostly in Việt Nam) (1940?1944)
Years 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
Acreage 3,600 ha 5,500 ha 10,000 ha 19,700 ha 30,600 ha
Yield 1,800 tons 2,200 tons 3,000 tons 4,700 tons 12,000 tons4
Source: Annuaire statistique de l?union française: F76
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It was not only jute and castor that were forcefully planted. Under the order of Japanese fascists, 
French colonials also forced farmers to grow ?peanuts.? Since jute was not a staple crop, it was not as 
devastating to the farmer when the total harvest was collected. However in the case of peanuts, since 
they constituted the main staple food, being forced to sell them to the Japanese army had grave conse-
quences for the farmer. They were some farmers who sold peanuts secretly in the markets but upon 
discovery, they were confiscated. In the past, if there was not enough rice, farmers could grow pota-
toes, maize or cassava instead but lands now were used to grow jute, castor, and peanuts. Staple food 
was in serious shortage and people?s lives were becoming increasingly diﬃcult.
The Japanese government?s policy of decreasing land available for growing rice and staple crops met 
with anger and many protests emerged throughout the country. In response to these actions of the 
people, National Salvation newspaper not only gave approval but also encouraged people not to supply 
rice to the Japanese military (Báo Cứu Quốc, 1943).
Yet, these Japanese activities were not only assisted by the French government, but also by the Trần 
Trọng Kim government. As we all know, on March 9, 1945, the Japanese assumed direct control over 
Vietnam by deposing the French in a coup and created the Trần Trọng Kim government to serve the 
occupation of the Japanese army. After the formation, the government negotiated with the Japanese 
fascists not to collect rice from the people, but in fact, this was a deceptive ploy to try to improve their 
standing with the people: ?the Japanese abandoned the rice collection policy in Central Vietnam be-
cause it was not a rice-growing region. As a result, due to this policy elimination, the Japanese not only 
did not suﬀer any loss, but it also helped the reputation of the Trần Trọng Kim puppet government and 
our people ended up being fooled? (Trần Huy Liệu, Nguyễn Khắc Đạm 1957: 62). Along with that, the 
Government of Trần Trọng Kim also organized the transport of rice from the South to the North, but 
on July 1, 1945, ?the people in the North upon seeing no rice from the South; likened the situation to a 
crying child waiting for a mother?s return from the market to provide her with milk, but is instead told 
lies.? (Trần Huy Liệu, Nguyễn Lương Bích, Nguyễn Khắc Đạm 1957: 65).
In addition, the Trần Trọng Kim government also negotiated with the Japanese fascists to provide 
tax relief for the people, but it did not lighten their burden because ?based on the communal land law 
in Vietnam at that time, a person with a few feet of land for a living was also classified as belonging to 
the proprietary class. Therefore, the number of people that were classified as the working class and 
were duty-free was trivial. Even in Northern Vietnam, there were only 50,000 people that were entitled 
to a duty-free status. In Central Vietnam, only a few working class people were entitled to the new tax 
relief (Trần Huy Liệu, Nguyễn Khắc Đạm 1957: 165). Moreover, this tax relief also distinguished be-
tween people in the North and those in Central Vietnam. Tax reduction actually meant a tax increase. 
This was the nature of the policy of the so-called ?Empire of Vietnam.? As a result, 4-months into its 
existence, from April 18 to August 19, 1945, the Trần Trọng Kim government was trying hard but still 
4 Total Acreage of castor in the year 1944 jumped by 27,000 ha compared to the year 1940.
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struggling to bring the Vietnamese people ?bogus independence? (Trần Huy Liệu, Nguyễn Lương Bích, 
Nguyễn Khắc Đạm 1957: 66).
Based on that, the study ?The Trần Trọng Kim?s Cabinet: Nature, Role and Historic Position? said: ?In 
fact, there is no evidence to prove that during the Trần Trọng Kim?s administration, his cabinet imple-
mented plans or orders made by the Japanese. The allegations of some researchers that this cabinet 
continued forcing people to plant jute instead of rice, collect rice for the Japanese fascists, etc. are un-
founded. In contrast, those policies had ended with the Japan?France coup, simultaneously, Trần 
Trọng Kim cabinet was the one who requested the Japanese to remove the rice collection policy and 
propose tax reduction? (Phạm Hồng Tung: 348). However, from an objective viewpoint, the Trần 
Trọng Kim cabinet was more or less responsible for the implementation of agricultural policy of Japan 
in Vietnam, including policies to abandon the cultivation of rice and staple crops to grow jute to serve 
the war eﬀort.
3. Consequences from Japanese agricultural policies in Vietnam
Firstly, it changed the agricultural system and severely reduced food crops production
Vietnam is an agricultural country. The main crops that are produced throughout the seasons are 
rice and staple crops. These foods have sustained the lives of Vietnamese people for thousands of years. 
However, since the Japanese invaded and implemented policies to force the Vietnamese people to grow 
capital intensive crops such as jute, castor and peanuts instead of rice and staple crops to support their 
war eﬀort and for export to Japan, the agricultural structure changed people?s lives, making them more 
and more diﬃcult.
Alongside the change in the agricultural structure, Japanese agricultural policies had a debilitating 
eﬀect on food crop production. Trung Bắc Chủ Nhật [North Central Sunday Journal] issue 172, dated 
on August 28, 1943 described: ?In many places, the quality of lands were so bad, that every year except 
for the reserved grain that was used as food until the next season, farmers did not have enough grain 
to submit, so they had to buy more grain to eat after selling grain to the government? (Trung Bắc Chủ 
Nhật 28 August 1943). By the end of 1944, unprecedented flooding occurred, which reduced rice pro-
duction from 1.0887 million tons to only 1,000,000 of this year. Of this, 125,000 tons were collected by 
the French (selling 35,000 tons to people in the city, 90,000 tons remaining were stored in France?Japa-
nese warehouses). 910,000 tons of rice left, minus 55,000 tons of rice seeds, people in the North could 
only use 855,000 tons which was just enough to feed 6 million 700 thousand people. The other 3 mil-
lion 30 thousand people had to eat maize, potatoes, cassava, etc. But the North only gained a small 
amount of these foods, about 147,000 tons, equivalent to 133,100 tons of rice, and crop production was 
only 80,000 tons, feeding about 60 thousand people over 7 months (Tạ Thị Thúy 2014: 64?565).
?The decline in food production has made millions of farmers suﬀer from hunger, and even starve to 
death because there was no food to eat. One of the most typical cases is the famine in the North in ear-
ly 1945? (Tạ Thị Thúy 2014).
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Secondly, the decline of agricultural production has created spiraling inflation in Vietnam
During Japan?s occupation of Vietnam, prices for some of the necessity goods skyrocketed. In 1940, 
the price of a quintal of rice in Hanoi was only 10.1 đồng. In 1943, the oﬃcial price was 31 đồng, but 
the price in the black market reached 57 đồng. In 1944, the oﬃcial price was 40 đồng while the price in 
the black market went up to seven times more than the previous year?s prices at 350 đồng. Finally in 
1945, the oﬃcial price was set at 53 đồng, black market prices soared from 700 to 800, which was dou-
bling hundreds of times from the initial period of the war (Nguyễn Phúc Lộc: 184).
By mid-May 1942, in Cochinchina, the price of food and other essential goods increased on average 
from 10? to 30?, sometimes up to 70?. According to reports from leaders of Sa Đéc (5.1942), the 
provincial food prices compared to the same period in 1941 increased by at least 11? and as high as 
77?: dried fish increased by 11?, vegetables increased by 35?, goods consumption increased by 
47?, and poultry increased by 77?. Meanwhile, prices in Long Xuyên in the same period (May 1942) 
also increased significantly as rice increased by 20?, vegetables up to 30?, and ice increased by 60? 
(Dương Trung Quốc 2000: 235?254).
Overall, the rapid increase in prices for essential food items had a huge impact on the lives of people 
in Vietnam. This situation became worse for crop production in 1944?1945. The cost of living in 
Saigon increased by 450?; in Hanoi, the cost of living increased by 200? (Marr, David G. 1980: 135).
Thirdly, a rice collection policy based on buying cheaply from the farmers directly caused 
famine in Vietnam
In the process of implementing its/her agricultural policy, Japan purchased a large quantity of food 
from Vietnamese people. Although it was known to be sold to Japan, in actual practice, the compulso-
ry sale of rice was blatant robbery. Rice prices were specified for each year as follows: in 1942 the price 
was 12.20 đồng/kg (Trung Bắc Chủ Nhật No 121), in 1943 it was 13.45 đồng/quintal while rice prices in 
Northern markets was 57 đồng/kg (Trần Huy Liệu, Nguyễn Lương Bích, Nguyễn Khắc Đạm 1957), in 
1945 the price was 14.68 đồng/quintal while the market price was 800 đồng/kg (Nguyễn Phúc Lộc).
It can be said that the rice collection policy of the Japanese government in which rice was sold for 
very cheap prices was the ?perpetrator of the terrible famine in Vietnam 1945? (Văn Tạo, Furuta 
Motoo 2011: 675).
In regards to this problem, in the Declaration of Independence, President Hồ Chí Minh aﬃrmed: ?In 
the autumn of 1940, when the Japanese fascists violated Indochina?s territory to establish new bases in 
their fight against the Allies, the French imperialists went down on their bended knees and handed 
over our country to them. Thus, from that date, our people were subjected to the double yoke of the 
French and the Japanese. Their suﬀerings and miseries increased. The result was that, from the end of 
last year to the beginning of this year, from Quảng Trị Province to Tonkin, more than two million of 
our fellow citizens died from starvation? (Hồ Chí Minh Completed Works, 2).
In addition, in the work ?Mây Trắng Đường Trường Chinh? by Văn Khuê, a historical witness and a 
farmer himself, who had gone through and witnessed the horrible famine genocide of the people in 
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Tonkin, caused by policies implemented by French colonialists and Japanese fascists has said: ?Right in 
Hanoi, many peasants in the vicinity dragged themselves to the city. They gathered around the mar-
kets, restaurants, temples, churches, and recreational grounds, and lived without stability on the road-
side while being forced to become beggars. Everyone was very weak, hovering like ghosts, their arms 
and legs were very scraggy, and black like a burnt rail. Faces were gaunt, leaving only two eye sockets 
and two protruding teeth on the skinny face. Unfortunately, that year was very cold, which chapped 
the arms and legs, and made them cold to the bone. So how could people who were so poor, hungry, 
thirsty, homeless, exposed to the wind and dew, and without blankets or mats stand it?? (Văn Khuê 
1997: 22).
Particularly, this remarkable famine has been reconstructed by authors Văn Tạo and Furuta Motoo 
in their study The 1945 Famine of Vietnam: Historical Records and Evidences, which gives a detailed de-
scription on the tragedy: In Hanoi, ?abandoned children or whose parents were dead had to drag 
themselves on the streets and stuﬀ leaves, phloem, and rubbish into their mouth. Dead people were 
scattered in the markets and alleys, lying on mats or sacks; common green bottle flies landed all over 
their faces. The atmosphere was heavy and depressing. The ox carts collected the dead bodies and 
those who were barely alive in the cart, had lime poured on them, and were carried to Giáp Bát and 
Cầu Giấy to be thrown into large pits dug out for them. People were hired to collect dead bodies in or-
der to get money to eat, until they themselves died and were picked up by others. Hungry dogs in the 
neighborhood dragged limbs of starving children to eat. It was macabre and tragic as hell. The humili-
ation and suﬀering was unbearable.? In Hải Phòng, ?the terrible famine?catastrophic consequences due 
to exploitative policies of the Japanese?French has caused thousands of people to starve in the district. 
There were half starving villages, many families had no one left in An Thọ, Bách Phương, An Tiên. In 
Hà Tây, ?during the famine in 1945, about 80 thousand people (almost 10? of the population in the 
province) died from starvation; many villages became dead, especially in areas where the craft had 
stagnated. In the village of La Ca (Hoài Đức district), there were 2,093 people who starved to death out 
of a total of 4,893 people, and of which 147 families had no one left in them. La Khê village (Hoài Đức 
district) had 2,100 people, in which 1,200 people died from starvation, accounting for 57? of the pop-
ulation.? In Hưng Yen, ?Liễu Trung village (Mỹ Vân) had so many dead people that there was no time 
to bury them. Five families had no one left. All had died because of starvation.? In Thái Bình province, 
?many villages had 50 to 80? of the population dying because of starvation. Sơn Thọ village (Thụyy 
Anh) has lost 1,025 people of which 965 people died of starvation (79? of the population); Thành Nê 
village (Kiến Xương) had 4,164 people, of which 1,854 people died of starvation. In just five months, 
the number of people who died of starvation in the province amounted to 280,000 people (about 25? 
of the population).? In Nghệ An, in less than three months, from the end of 1944 to the beginning of 
1945, 42,630 people died of hunger. Of the 16,358 families that had family members die, 2,250 families 
had no one left. In Hà Tĩnh, only Nghi Xuân district had 8,161 people dead. Xuân Viên village had 
1,165 people dead? (Văn Tạo, Furuta Motoo 2011: 642?660).
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Two million people died of hunger in this tragic event with disastrous consequences. The number of 
people who starved to death accounted for a quarter of the North?s population, a tenth of the country?s 
population at that time, and 10 times higher than the number of Japanese victims who died from the 
two US atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in World War II.
*
In summary, during the invasion and occupation of Vietnam that spanned a five-year period, the 
Japanese military government implemented reactionary policies against the Vietnamese people, espe-
cially policies in the agricultural sector. These policies focused on purchasing and collecting rice, corn 
and grains from the Vietnamese people while forcing them to grow jute, castor and peanut instead of 
rice and staple crops aimed at serving Japanese fascists.
Such brutal policies by the French?Japanese administrators resulted in serious consequences for ag-
ricultural production as well as the land situation in Vietnam after the Revolution. The outcome of the 
rice collection policies, together with national disasters, diseases, crop failures and war not only made 
the agricultural economy of Vietnam face a period of severe crisis, deforming the agricultural econom-
ic structure, including change in the plant structure that led to a significant fall in food production, 
and price escalation, but also directly caused the terrible famine in Vietnam in early 1945.
In response to the rice collection policies, resentment and hostility by the Vietnamese people toward 
Japanese fascists increased tremendously. It became one of the most direct and important factors that 
enabled the Indochinese Communist Party and the Việt Minh Front to recruit and mobilize people to 
conduct raids on Japanese granaries and rice storage facilities from April 1945. Soon after, they 
launched the general insurrection against the Franco?Japanese government. Their eﬀorts placed in 
careful and long term planning finally bore fruit when they were able to regain their national indepen-
dence and freedom in the August Revolution of 1945.
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